. Opdycke tigers, 125th O. V. I., a history of the regiment and of the campaigns and battles of the Army of the Cumberland . ^ and ar-tillery. Hood, after deducting losses atColumbia, Spring Hill and Franklin couldonly muster 44,000, and although still su-perior in cavahy, he was no longer in con-dition after the battle of Franklin to jirosecute an offensivecampaign. But he wanted the moral effect of threateningNashville, and moved forward without delay. GeneralThomas thought best to delay offensive movements for a fewdays to refit generally, and especially to equi[) and remountthe dismounted
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. Opdycke tigers, 125th O. V. I., a history of the regiment and of the campaigns and battles of the Army of the Cumberland . ^ and ar-tillery. Hood, after deducting losses atColumbia, Spring Hill and Franklin couldonly muster 44, 000, and although still su-perior in cavahy, he was no longer in con-dition after the battle of Franklin to jirosecute an offensivecampaign. But he wanted the moral effect of threateningNashville, and moved forward without delay. GeneralThomas thought best to delay offensive movements for a fewdays to refit generally, and especially to equi[) and remountthe dismounted cavalry.. Ma.I. liKN. A. J. S.MITH 360 OPDYCKE TIGERS, The government and General Grant were urgent intheir demands for a prompt offensive movement. Theydid not like the moral effect of a transfer of the scene ofhostilities from Atlanta back to Nashville, after eighteenmonths of campaigning and fighting, and all the sacrificesmade to drive the enemy step by step from Mnrfreesboro toAtlanta, and they were apprehensive of almost irreparableinjury to the railway lines if Hood was allowed to intrenchand then detach his cavalry on raids. The difference ofopinion as to the proper time to fight almost cost Thomashis command. He was ready to move by the 10th, but wasthen delayed until the 15th by the ground being coveredwith ice. On the 13th General John A.Logan was orderedto jS^ashville to supercede Thomas, but went reluctantly andon arriving at Louisville heard of the success of the fighting-on the loth, and readily obtained permission to turn back.Thomas forces were in position, Smithscorps on the r